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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. AP-00-37
AP-00-42

CONSUMERS FOR AFFORDABLE
HEALTH CARE, et al,
Petitioners
DECISION AND ORDER

V,

SUPERINTENDENT OF
INSURANCE, et al,
Respondent
This matter is before the court on motion of the Superintendent of Insurance to
strike the Attorney GeneraFs independent claim and to dismiss the same. This matter
was commenced by the Attorney General filing, on June 26, 2000, a petition for review
of final agency action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, and independent claim for relief.
Petitioner asks the court to find that a decision of the Superintendent of Insurance in
regard to the application of Associated Hospital Service of Maine, d/b/a Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Maine, to convert to a stock insurer was in violation of statute,
affected by error of law or unsupported by substantial evidence on the record. The
Attorney General further seeks to modify the decision to require an updated appraisal
and appropriate compensation for the charitable foundation created in conjunction with
legislation authorizing the conversion. In a separate action, subsequently consolidated
by this court, Consumers for Affordable Health Care, on June 5, 2000, brought a
petition for review of final agency action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C seeking review
of the action.

This matter involves a challenge by the Consumers for Affordable Health Care
and the Attorney General to the decision of the Superintendent of Insurance to
approve, subject to conditions, the conversion of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine to a
domestic stock insurer and the acquisition of substantially all of the assets of Blue
Cross/Blue Shield by a subsidiary of Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. Legislation
enacted by the Legislature in 1997 addressed the conversion issue and established two
requirements.
First, the Attorney General was to create a charitable trust with court approval
and, second, the Superintendent of Insurance was given the responsibility for
approving the terms of the conversion and acquisition of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Maine. Under the legislation, the charitable trust created by the Attorney General is to
receive the fair market value from the sale of Blue Cross/Blue Shield assets. In its
independent claim, the Attorney General seeks to exercise his implied powers with
regard to charitable organizations by challenging the value of Blue Cross/Blue Shield as
determined by the Superintendent in an effort to require additional funds to be
deposited into the charitable trust.

It is an independent claim becarise the

Superintendent of Insurance clearly has no authority to order Anthem to provide
additional funds now that the Superintendent's decision has been rendered and the
conversion has taken place.
The Superintendent seeks dismissal of the independent action because he
believes the essence of the Attorney General's administrative appeal is that the
Superintendent did not properly determine the fair market value of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Maine and this challenge is redundant of his 80C petition for review. The
Superintendent asserts that the Attorney General's authority over charities does not
2

create an independent right to file this action against a mon-charity such as the
Superintendent of Insurance because, among other reasons, the statutory jurisdictional
basis authorizing the Attorney General to enforce "due application of funds given or
appropriated to public charities within the state and prevent breaches in trust in the
administration thereof" (5 M.R.S.A. § 194) does not provide a basis upon which the
Attorney General can sue a non-charity,
government." Petitioner's motion, p.5.

. . much less another arm of state

The Superintendent further argues that the

statutes governing the transaction contemplate that the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and Rule 80C provides the exclusive remedy for challenging the
Superintendent's decision. The Superintendent goes on to complain that the Attorney
General's claim is not an "independent" action in that the administrative appeal and the
independent claim make the same factual allegation and seek the same relief.
Independently, Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. and Anthem Health Plans of
Maine, Inc. challenge the Attorney General's independent claim by arguing that it is a
"noncognizable collateral attack" on the decision and is barred by the Law Court
decision of Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Authority, 385 A.2d 189 (Me. 1978). Anthem's
motion, p. 1. Anthem, too, argues that the APA review is the exclusive avenue for
challenging the failure of the Superintendent to comply with the law and further asserts
that the Attorney General's claim is a collateral attack which ignores the
Superintendent's ruling. For support of this proposition, it cites Lovell v. One Bancorp,
614 A.2d 56 (Me. 1992). Anthem also argues that the Attorney General should be
estopped from making such a claim since his activity with the charitable trust and that
trust approval of the transaction constitutes a waiver of such complaint.

3,

To all this, the Attorney General relies upon his interpretation of the common
law and statutory duties as chief law enforcement officer of Maine/ as well as the more
specific administrative review responsibility in the statute. See 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 194 &
194-A. The Attorney General cites a large body of cases approving the exercise of his
authority in dealing with charitable trust matters including language from Lund ex ret.
Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d 554 (Me. 1973) which confirms that the Attorney General is
endowed with all common law powers. The Wilbur Court explained:
The Attorney General . . . may, in the absence of some express legislative
restriction to the contrary/ exercise all such power and authority as public
interest may, from time-to-time require/ and may institute/ and conduct
all such actions and proceedings as he deems necessary for the
enforcement of the laws of the state, the preservation of order, and the
protection of public rights ."
Id. at 558. (Emphasis in original).
It is interesting to note that the Attorney General has emphatically argued that
the court should not consider the independent claim until the Rule 80C review has been
completed. Obviously/ he seeks to reserve the right to seek more consideration from
the acquiring corporation than authorized under the Superintendent's decision if the
court agrees to modify the conclusion by the Superintendent. He wants "a second bite
at the apple." For this reason, the court has determined that the motion to dismiss the
independent claim must be determined first and consider whether it is truly an
"independent" claim, whether there is clear authority apart from the legislative scheme
of administrative review or whether Rule 80C is the sole remedy and authority in the
Attorney General under the circumstances.
Consumers lends support to the Attorney General's position that he is
authorized by the common law to bring the independent claim.
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Consumers for

Affordable Health Care argues that the independent claim is simply asking the court to
invoke its equitable jurisdiction over the matter and to provide a remedy of
disgorgement if an updated valuation should be approved in excess of $81.69 million.
The Attorney General's independent claim is, at its essence, an attack on the
inaction of the Superintendent of Insurance. Specifically, the Attorney General accuses
the Superintendent of failing to accept an updated valuation of Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of Maine which is part of his statutory duties. 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(I). In this sense,
it cannot be characterized as an independent claim. There is no true independent basis
for relief from agency action.

Instead, the claim is a replication of the Attorney

General's 80C appeal and as such it is properly characterized as a collateral attack. The
Attorney General attempts to justify the procedural posture he has created by reliance
upon the wide latitude given to him, largely by common law, in the enforcement of
charitable trusts. Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park Authority, 385 A.2d 189, 194-95 (Me.
1978); 5 M.R.S.A. § 194. There is nothing exceptional or controversial about the
proposition that the Attorney General has broad oversight powers of charitable trusts.
However, that broad principle is not unbounded.1
The Attorney General argues that the statutory language in 5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A(4)
endorses his independent enforcement authority. He also refers to P.L. 1997, ch. 344, §
11(6) for the proposition that the Attorney General's charitable trust authority was not
limited by the Act, and therefore must encompass the ability to bring the present
independent claim. The relevant portion of chapter 344 states: "This Act does not limit1

1 The court notes with interest that the Superintendent of Insurance is represented in these
proceedings by private counsel rather than an assistant attorney general normally assigned to the
Bureau of Insurance. While the Baxter State Park Authority was considered a form of charitable trust,
it also was clearly considered by the Court to be a state agency.
5

in any way the Attorney General's charitable trust authority or the Superintendent of
Insurance's authority under the Maine Revised Statutes/ Title 24 and Title 24-A except as
expressly provided in this Act." Id. The Attorney General's reliance on this language as
evidence that he may bring the present independent claim is predicated on the false
assumption that the Attorney General's charitable trust authority includes the ability to
collaterally attack an order of a State agency. It is the court's conclusion that the
Attorney General's authority does not extend this far. This conclusion is supported by
doctrinal as well as practical reasons.
While the facts in Lovell v. One Bancorp, 614 A.2d 56 (Me. 1992) are somewhat
different from the present case/ the court's analysis there is useful. The court concluded
that the statutory scheme governing the Superintendent of Banking's authority to
approve mutual-to-stock conversions displaced private common law claims. Interested
parties could/ however/ appeal from the Superintendent's decision to the Superior
Court pursuant to M.R. Civ, P. 80C. Id. at 62. So, too/ it seems that the Attorney
General's independent claim is displaced by the legislative preference/ expressed
through statute/ for the Superintendent of Insurance to determine Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Maine's fair market value. 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301 et seq. This delegation of
authority to highly specialized state agencies is well established and has been revealed
as a preferable way to resolve disputes in technical areas such as insurance. To allow
the Attorney General to bring this independent claim would interpose the court in what
is primarily the business of the Superintendent of Insurance as it has been circumscribed
by the Legislature. This action would substantially debilitate the very purpose for
which the administrative agency was created; to wit, to dispose of technical issues on
which the agency has expertise. The principles of administrative law are not suspended
6

in this case by bare reference to the Attorney General's broad authority in the oversight
and enforcement of charitable trusts. This court declines to carve out an exception for
the Attorney General that will have such a destabilizing effect on the work of
administrative agencies and result in court jurisdiction inconsistent with the legislative
scheme of regulation.
This action comes within M..R. Civ. P. 80C. The Rule provides that the manner
and scope of review shall be governed by 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 11007(2) - 11007(4). While
subsection 3 of that statute requires the court not to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency in questions of fact subsection 4 of that same provision authorizes the court
to remand for further proceedings or to modify the decision. If the Superintendent has
violated a statutory provision/ exceeded his authority/ or otherwise violated the
mandate of section 11007(4)(C)/ the court may modify the decision or require further
proceedings for determination of value. Should this court/ pursuant to Rule 80C
proceedings/ determine that the Superintendent was in error and remand the matter to
the Superintendent/ he may well conclude/ after appropriate proceedings/ that the
appraisal was untimely and make a determination that the value of the assets of Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Maine was greater than that found in his earlier decision. This/
then/ would cause the Superintendent to modify his decision and his approval of the
demutualization and sale of assets. This dismissal of the independent claim should in no
event be considered a determination whether the Attorney General/ on behalf of the
charitable trust/ could pursue an independent common law and statutory action against
Anthem for disgorgement of funds in accordance with the Superintendent's amended
order. The court notes that in such a case, the action would be a claim by the Attorney
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General on behalf of the charitable trust created by statute against a third party, not a
state administrative agency.
For the reasons stated above, the entry will be:
The motion of Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. and Anthem
Health Plans of Maine, Inc. to dismiss the Attorney GeneraPs
"independent" claim is GRANTED; the Superintendent of Insurance's
motion to strike the independent claim is considered by the court to be a
motion to dismiss and is GRANTED.

Dated: May

t F~ . 2001
Donald H. Marden
Justice, Superior Court
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G. STEVEN ROW E
ATTORN EY GENERAL
Public Protection Division
6 Slate House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006

Phone; 626-8838
FAX: 624-7730
email: christina.mo>’lan@st:ite.tr)e,us

Memorandum
To:
Steven Rowe, Attorney General
From: Christina M. Moylan, AAG
^
cc:
Linda Pistner, Chief Deputy Attorney General
Bill Laubenstein, Chief General Government Division
Date: January 2, 2002
Re:
Anthem decision

Attached is a copy of the decision Justice Marden issued in Consumers for Affordable
Health Care/Attomey General v. Superintendent of Insurance affirming the Superintendent’s
approval. Tracking the respondent’s arguments, Justice Marden found that the Superintendent’s
interpretation of the statute was entitled to great deference and was a reasonable one. He also
found that, while there was conflicting evidence, there was sufficient evidence to support the
decision on valuation. In light of the standard of review and the passage of time, I think an
appeal to the Law Court would have little chance of success.
Please let me know if you would like to discuss this and whether you want to consider an
appeal. Bill Laubenstein should be part of any discussion.

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION ■
DOCKET NO. AP-00-037
& AP-00-042

CONSUMERS FOR AFFORDABLE
HEALTH CARE, et ¿A,

Petitioners
v.
ALESSANDRO IUPPA,
SUPERINTENDENT
OF INSURANCE, et al,

ORDER ON PETITION
FOR REVIEW OF FINAL
AGENCY ACTION PURSUANT
TO M.R. CIV. P. 80C

Respondents
This matter is before the court on petition for review of final agency action
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. The petitioner is a nonprofit social welfare corporation
concerned with the delivery of health services in the State of Maine. It is joined by the
Attorney General of the State of Maine who filed a separate action, AP-00-042, which
has been joined. The petitioners seek to have this court find erroneous the action of the
Superintendent of Insurance in determining a value for Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine
in conjunction with a conversion from a nonprofit health services organization to a
stock corporation.1
Because the history, both statutorily and procedurally, is important to the court's
analysis, it will be reviewed here. As described by the Superintendent in his 85-page
decision and order, Associated Hospital Service of Maine, d/b/a Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Maine, and Anthem Insurance Cos., Inc., applied to the Superintendent of the

1
The Attorney General's petition carried an independent claim for relief. The Superintendent
of Insurance moved to strike the independent claim and Anthem Insurance Cos. moved to dismiss the
independent claim. By its Decision and Order of May 18, 2001, the court granted the motion and the 80C
review is the only matter presently before the court.

Maine Bureau of Insurance for approval of a series of related transactions. It was
proposed that Blue Cross/Blue Shield would convert from a nonprofit hospital and
medical service organization to a domestic stock insurance company named AHS
Liquidating Corporation. Anthem Insurance Cos.'s Maine-based domiciled subsidiary,
Anthem Health Plans of Maine, Inc., would be authorized to transact insurance business
in the State of Maine. Immediately upon the conversion of Blue Cross/Blue Shield to a
stock insurer, AHS Liquidating was to sell substantially all of its assets to Anthem
Health Plan. Upon the sale of the assets, AHS Liquidating would dissolve and the funds
representing the proceeds of the asset sale to Anthem, less liabilities, were to be placed
into a charitable trust for the benefit of the Maine Health Access Foundation, Inc. which
was established under statute by order of the Superior Court. Funds in the charitable
trust were to be used pay off the terminal liabilities and any net proceeds were to be
conveyed to the charitable foundation.
In 1997, the Legislature clarified the 100% charitable status of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Maine in the event of its conversion to a stock insurer prior to December 31,
2000. It required Blue Cross/Blue Shield to file an ownership interest and charitable
purposes statement with the Attorney General, who was then charged with the
responsibility of filing an action in Superior Court seeking approval. These actions
were taken and the statement of charitable interest and charitable purposes was
approved by the Superior Court in 1998. The 1997 law also recognized that Blue
Cross/Blue Shield was subject to some oversight by the Attorney General, as the
representative of the charitable ownership interest, and by the Superintendent of
Insurance, as the proper regulator of the insurance-like functions of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield. These statutes, 5 M.R.SA. § 194-A and 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D), established
2

procedures for Blue Cross/Blue Shield/ the Attorney General and the Superintendent to
follow should Blue Cross/Blue Shield decide to convert to a stock insurer.

In

accordance with these statutes/ Blue Cross/Blue Shield filed a charitable trust plan with
the Attorney General/ the Attorney General filed an action with the Superior Court
seeking approval of the modified charitable trust plan/ and the court approved the
modified version.
In July of 1999/ the Board of Directors of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine
announced the conversion plan and agreement to sell assets. A formal filing of the
proposal was made with the Superintendent of Insurance on September 15/ 1999. In
addition to consideration of extensive filings by the applicants and interested parties/
the Superintendent also held public comment portions of public hearings at locations
around the State of Maine. The office of the Superintendent took more than 10 months
for consideration of the matter with its staff spending over 6,000 hours in review of
filed material. Independent experts were retained by the Superintendent. Dated May
25/ 2000/ the Superintendent issued his Decision and Order approving the applications
to convert Blue Cross/Blue Shield to a for-profit stock insurer and to voluntarily
dissolve. The approval order also included the applications of Anthem to acquire the
assets and liabilities of the converted Blue Cross/Blue Shield. All approvals were
subject to some 35 conditions as spelled out in the order. None of the 35 conditions
would appear to be matters for review by this court.
The petition of Consumers Affordable Health Care seeks "reversal" of that
portion of the Superintendent's decision that established a value of the outstanding
stock of AHS Liquidating Corporation. It alleges the decision violates state law and is
not supported by substantial evidence in the record. It asks the court to reverse the
3

agency action under appeal,2 declare the Superintendent's decision establishing the
value to be in violation of state statute and award costs and fees in the action.

The

Attorney General, in its petition for review, alleges that the Superintendent's decision is
in violation of statutory provisions, affected by an error of law, and unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record insofar as it determined the fair market of the
aggregate equity of Blue Cross upon conversion. The complaint specifically advises the
court that it does not seek to reverse the approval of the conversion and does not seek
to block or require a rescission of the sale of the assets. Rather, the Attorney General
requests only to "reverse" the Superintendent's decision and "to require Blue
Cross/Blue Shield to update the statutorily mandated appraisal of the fair market value
of the aggregate equity of the converted company." Petition Ketterer v. IUPPA, AP-0042.
Title 5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A, located within that title dealing with administrative
procedures and services of state government, more particularly the Office of the
Attorney General, specifically dictates that a nonprofit hospital and medical service
organization is a charitable and benevolent institution and a public charity with its
assets held for purposes of fulfilling the charitable purposes of the organization.
5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A(1)(K) (Supp. 2000).

Such an organization may not convert to a

domestic stock insurer under Title 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301 (9-D) unless the Superior Court
first approves the organization's charitable trust plan and outlines the Attorney
General's responsibility thereto. The statute specifically provides that the charitable
trust shall receive the ownership interest in the organization following a conversion to a

2
At oral argument, petitioner stressed that it did not desire to overturn the entire transaction,
simply that portion dealing with valuation on behalf of the Foundation.
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domestic stock insurer provided it meets certain conditions. 5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A(2). The
section also provides that if the organization materially changes its form on or before
December 31, 2000, 100% of the fair market value of the organization will be owned by
the charitable trust and the charitable trust shall be defined with specific conditions. Id.
The section further provides a definition of "fair market value" as:
The value of an organization or an affiliate or of the assets of such an
entity determined, consistent with Title 24, section 2301, subsection 9-D, as
if the entity had voting stock outstanding and 100% of its stock were
freely transferrable and available for purchase without restrictions. In
determining fair market value, consideration must be given to value as a
going concern, market value, investment or earnings value, net asset
value and a control premium, if any. If a charitable trust receives, at the
time of conversion, 100% of the shares of the then outstanding stock of
the converted domestic stock insurer, the charitable trust is regarded as
having acquired the fair market value of the organization unless the
Superintendent finds that such outstanding stock does not represent the
fair market value of the organization.
5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A(2)(G).
Finally, with regard to Title 5, the court notes the provision of section 194A(5) (D) which says:
In approving, disapproving or approving with modification a charitable
trust plan, the Superior Court may not review or decide the
methodologies for determining the fair market value of the organization,
the methodology for allocating and transferring to the owners the
ownership interest identified in the statement of ownership of interest and
charitable purposes approved by the Superior Court of a fair market
value of the organization. . . .
The responsibility of the Superintendent of Insurance in this scheme is found in
the Insurance Code, Title 24 M.R.S.A. at 2301(9-D) which provides for the conversion to
a domestic stock insurer. First the statute authorizes a nonprofit hospital and medical
service organization to convert to a domestic stock insurer subject to the provisions of
the section. It defines a conversion plan as a "written plan that sets forth the provisions
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required by the Superintendent, that is filed with the Superintendent pursuant to this
subsection, that sets forth a complete description of the proposed conversion and that
contains sufficient detail to permit the Superintendent to make the findings required
under this section." 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301 (9-D) (B)(4). (emphasis supplied). Subsection 9-D
also contains a definition of "fair market value" as "the value of an organization or an
affiliate of the value of the assets of such an entity determined as if the entity had voting
stock outstanding and 100% of its stock were fully transferrable and available for
purchase without restrictions. In determining fair value, consideration must be given to
value as a going concern, market value, investment or earnings value, net asset value
and a control premium, if any." Id. § 2301 (9-D)(B)(6).
The section specifically provides that the nonprofit hospital and medical service
organization may amend its charter to become a domestic stock insurer in compliance
with a plan that is "approved by the Superintendent after an adjudicatory hearing on
the proposed conversion." Id. § 2301(9-D)(C). The section goes on to require the
Superintendent to commence review of a conversion plan upon receipt of the Superior
Court's approval of the charitable trust plan but with the mandate that he may not
issue final approval of a conversion plan unless he finds that: "The terms and conditions
of the conversion plan are fair and equitable and, in determining what is fair and
equitable, consideration may be given to, but is not limited to, the factors set forth in
subparagraph L of section 9-D." Id. § 2301(9~D)(E). Subparagraph L reads:
In making a determination under paragraph E (l) as to whether a
conversion plan is fair and equitable the Superintendent shall consider,
among other factors, the following:
(1)
Whether the conversion plan complies with the provisions of and
purposes of this subsection and any rules of the Superintendent that may
be adopted under this subsection; and
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(2)
Whether the conversion plan would adversely affect, in any
manner, the services to be rendered to be subscribers.
The statutory requirement in subsection 9-D primarily at issue in this review is
subsection I:
The conversion plan must include an appraisal of the fair market value, or
range of values, of the aggregate equity of the converted stock insurer to
be outstanding upon completion of the conversion plan and, if a range in
value, the methodology for fixing a final value coincident with the
completion of the transactions provided for in the conversion plan.
(1)
The appraisal must enable determinations of value for purposes of:
(a)
The amount of. cash or other assets that subscribers of
the charitable trust will be entitled to receive, without
consideration, under the provisions of the conversion plan
required by paragraph E, subparagraphs (3) and (4); and
(b)
The price of any shares to be issued pursuant to the
optional provisions of a conversion plan permitted by
paragraph G.3
(2)
The appraisal required by this paragraph must be prepared by
persons independent of the organization, experienced and expert in the
area of corporate appraisal and acceptable to the Superintendent. The
appraisal must be in a form and content acceptable to the Superintendent
and contain a complete and detailed description with the elements that
make up the appraisal, justification for the methodology employed and
sufficient support for the conclusions reached in the appraisal.
(emphasis supplied).
A further provision in subsection 9-D(I) is its subsection (5), a mandate that
appears to be relevant to whether the Superintendent of Insurance has the legal
authority to simply modify a valuation without jeopardizing the complete approval.
The section states, M
[i]n those instances when the Superintendent determines that the
appraisal is materially deficient or substantially incomplete, the Superintendent may
deem the entire conversion plan materially deficient or substantially incomplete and
3
This paragraph authorizes a provision in a conversion plan in which the converted stock
insurer would make a simultaneous offer of its shares of its capital stock for cash to officers, directors,
or employees. The shares offered must be "priced in a manner consistent with the fair market of the
aggregate equity of the converter stock insurer to be outstanding following the completion of the
conversion plan, established pursuant to paragraph I." 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9T))(G).
7

decline to further process or reject the application for conversion." Id. § 2301(9-D)(I)(5).
The language is not mandatory. It is obviously there for a reason which may give
some insight into the overall statutory scheme created by the Legislature.
In this instance, the applicant did file an appraisal with its conversion plan and the
Superintendent found that appraisal was prepared by persons sufficiently independent
of Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and sufficiently experienced and expert in the area of
corporate appraisal. The appraisal date was "as of July 13, 1999." Superintendent's
Decision, p. 37, The Superintendent concluded from his interpretation of the law that
"the statute neither required nor anticipates that the Superintendent or any intervenor
would file a competing appraisal. Rather, the statute contemplates a scenario whereby
the Superintendent and intervenors would test the reasonableness of the appraisal
submitted as part of the conversion plan." Id.

The Superintendent further interprets

his mandate that 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(I) "[rjequires the filing of an appraisal that sets
forth the fair market value of the aggregate equity of the converted stock insurer." Id.
That phrase, "the aggregate equity of the converted stock insurer," as the
Superintendent understands it and in the context of the Conversion Statute, means the
fair market value of AHS Liquidating (the converted stock insurer) after having
accounted for the liabilities of Blue Cross. In other words, it is the "fair market value of
the Foundation's 100% ownership interest in BCBSME following the conversion with
the conversion being the mechanism to account for Blue Cross liability." Id. The
Superintendent then goes on to utilize the appraisal submitted with the plan for
approval as "the starting point" for determining the Foundation's interest in the
charitable asset. In this case, as of July 13, 1999, that was $102.5 million. After some
discussion with regard to substantive challenges, the Superintendent concluded:
8

Based on the foregoing and the totality of the testimonial and
documentary evidence in the record/ the Superintendent finds that the
H.L.H.Z. appraisal utilized reasonable methodologies in ascertaining the
fair market value of the converted insurer's aggregate equity as of July 13,
1999/ and the value reached by H.L.H.Z. is equally reasonable/ represents
the fair market value of the aggregate equity of the converted insurer and
is supported by evidence in the record/ thereby satisfying the legal
requirements contained in 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(I).
Id. p. 38. Then/ having concluded that the valuation was reasonable/ the Superintendent
determined to ascertain the "aggregate equity to be owned by the Foundation upon
conversion/ that is, the amount of assets the Foundation would be entitled to receive."
Id. p. 39.
At this point/ the Superintendent reasoned forward to determine the aggregate
equity of the Foundation’s interest in the converted insurer. Addressing the complaints
by parties to the proceeding that he was required/ under their interpretation of the
statute/ to determine a fair market value of Blue Cross/Blue Shield as of the date of
conversion/ i.ev the date of closing of the proposed transaction/ the Superintendent
presented the following reasoning:
First/ the Superintendent concludes that the statutes do not require the
Superintendent to determine the fair market value of Blue Cross/Blue Cross but,
instead/ to determine the fair market of the aggregate equity held by the Foundation in
the converted insurer which determination would be based upon the appraisal filed
with the conversion plan. Secondly/ he concluded that to require an appraisal as of the
date of completion would render the application of the statute an absurdity since the
date of completion of the plan was not established at the time of his approval/ that the
valuations would be changing over time, that it is impossible to obtain an appraisal as
of a date of dosing and complete a dosing on the same day and that his mandate was to
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determine whether the fair market value suggested was, under statutory language, 'fair
and equitable' or in his decision, "fair and reasonable."
Id. at 39.
The Superintendent goes on to rely on statutory interpretation as required in
Kimball v. Land Use Regulation Commission, 2000 ME 20, 745 A.2d 387, and Coker v. City of
Lewiston, 1998 ME 93, 710 A.2d 909 (the statutory scheme from which language arises
must be interpreted to achieve a harmonious outcome. Statutory language shall not be
construed to effect absurd, illogical or inconsistent results). The Superintendent further
analyzes the statutory provision as part of the overall regulatory scheme. Further
analysis illustrates the Superintendent's understanding of the intent of the legislation, to
mandate filing an appraisal in advance of any adjudicatory hearing and to avoid a
circular process caused by a requirement for subsequent appraisals.

The

Superintendent concludes that the Legislature intended the appraisal provide a baseline
fair market value of the aggregate equity of the converted insurer which would be
analyzed through the approval process and that its use is to enable a determination of
value of the amount the Foundation would be entitled to receive. 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9D)(I)(1). Using the appraisal as a baseline, the reviewing court could then apply an
analysis of subsequent financial transactions and results, utilize the requirements of the
statute and reach a conclusion as to the valuation of the aggregate equity in the
converted insurer for purposes of his approval.4

4
The Superintendent's responsibility was to approve a conversion plan. Included in that plan
were the responsibilities of the Insurance Bureau to regulate the insurer that resulted from that process.
In some respects, the offer by Anthem to purchase the assets was somewhat coincidental to the
conversion approval. However, having determined the value and realizing that the offer to purchase
assets was at least as great as its value, the credibility of the overall transaction seemed to be
confirmed.
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The Attorney General and the Consumers for Affordable Health Care argue that
the decision is tainted by an error of law caused by incorrect interpretation by the
Superintendent of the fair market value appraisal required by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Maine. In essence, they argue that any appraisal contained in the conversion plan must
provide a value of the equity of the converted insurer upon completion of the
conversion plan.

Consumers for Affordable Health Care argues that the

Superintendent read the mandated "valuation date" out of the conversion statute. The
Attorney General argues that the appraisal must be designed with a forward look to
estimate the value at the time of completion of the plan. In that regard, petitioner
asserts that the decision is invalid as based upon filings and not in conformance with
statute. It is further argued that the fundamental error by the Superintendent is his
conclusion that an appraisal cannot be presented to him for consideration if it is based
upon a future date, i.e., the closing date which represents the completion of the plan.
Further, it is argued that the Superintendent did not comply with the expert opinion of
the appraiser that certain factors would be required in considering an update of the
appraisal, factors which were not analyzed and put into evidence.
in response, the Superintendent argues that the statute only requires a single
appraisal and makes no mention of or inference for subsequent or supplemental
appraisals. Secondly, the statute requires that the appraisal must be included in the
proposed conversion plan.

The conversion plan initiates the submission of the

application and starts the entire proceeding. Consequently, the appraisal must be in
place at the initiation of the process. Further, since the approval or disapproval date is
unknown, determining the closing date is even more speculative and no target time for
consideration of a value is available. In addition, since the standard obligation of the
11

Superintendent is to determine whether the conversion plan is fair and equitable, the
Superintendent first needs to accept the application and appraisal and then may
independently review.
On this point, a preliminary observation must be made. At a certain point in the
proceeding, the Superintendent determined from the application by Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Maine that its conversion plan was complete, thereby initiating his review
process. That application and plan contained an appraisal based upon a valuation date
of Blue Cross/Blue Shield's leadership approved the transaction, July 13, 1999. The
record indicates the Superintendent solicited objections to his finding that the
application was complete and received none from either petitioner. If the appraisal was
founded upon an incorrect valuation date based upon the petitioner's interpretation of
the statute, was it not incumbent upon them to object to the Superintendent's finding of
completeness? Had they done so, and had they convinced the Superintendent of their
interpretation of the statute, he could then have rejected the application as not in
compliance with the statutory requirements.
The Superintendent argues under Kimball that to follow the petitioner's
interpretation of the statute would lead to an absurd result, or, more particularly, a
circular requirement leading to an impossibility.

The Superintendent has the

responsibility to evaluate the appraisal and determine whether it leads to a fair and
equitable result. In order to be determined as of the date of completion of the plan, it
would have to predicated upon a value under the conditions that exist after the
approval by the Superintendent. Requiring that approval would place the appraisal
process at the end of the proceedings rather than the beginning as required by statute.
This circular reasoning leads the Superintendent to believe that this result could not
12

possibly have been the intent of the Legislature in order to comply with the context of
the entire statutory scheme.
Petitioner argues that there is no other possible interpretation of the statute
except one that would cause the Superintendent to conclude that he must find the fair
market value of the aggregate equity from an appraisal based upon the completion of
the plan.

In other words, that the term "outstanding upon completion of the

conversion plan" modifies the "appraisal" or the "fair market value." However, the
Superintendent argues that it is just as reasonable and more compelling to consider the
statute requiring that the term "outstanding upon completion of the conversion plan"
modifies the "aggregate equity" and not the "appraisal" or "fair market value." If there
are two reasonable interpretations of this statute creating prima facie evidence of an
ambiguity, this court looks to the deference issue.
The Attorney General argues that the Superintendent is not entitled to the
deference provided by case law. "Special deference is due when the issues subject to
review lie within the scope of the agency's technical expertise."
Superintendent o f Insurance, 1997 ME

CWCO, Inc. v.

6, 703 A.2d 1258,1260 (citing Maine AFL-CIO v.

Superintendent o f Insurance, 595 A.2d 424, 429 (Me. 1991) (agency's interpretation of
technical statutes and regulations given due consideration)). The Attorney General
argues that this is a new statute created expressly for the transaction now before the
court and that such a series of circumstances is new both as to the law and the facts to
the State agency. The Attorney General argues, therefore, that the Superintendent of
Insurance does not possess the necessary experUse or particular technical knowledge to
be given deference in this instance. The argument is incorrect for two reasons. First,
the court must assume that the Legislature determined that the Bureau of Insurance did
13

possess the necessary expertise or, was in possession of greater expertise than any
other agency/ to conduct the review. Secondly, the statute contemplates the existence
of an ongoing domestic stock insurer as one of the options to Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Maine. Rather than liquidating upon sale of assets, the applicant could have simply
continued to carry on business as a regulated for-profit insurance company. Indeed,
one of the requirements of the Superintendent is to determine the financial credibility of
the resulting domestic stock insurer based upon all of the finances of the case. Further,
the Superintendent and the Bureau of Insurance is constantly making determinations in
its certificate of authority licensing functions as to the financial capability and values of
insurers for the protection of the insured public of Maine. The Superintendent is
entitled to a great deal of deference under these circumstances.
In his decision, the Superintendent provides the following definition:
Aggregate, equity, as defined previously, represents the charitable
Foundations ownership interest in the converted insurer. Assuming any
conversion takes place prior to December 31, 2000, the charitable
Foundation holds a 100% interest. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A(2)(A). As
generally defined in valuation circles, equity is the fair market value of an
entity as of the valuation date. In the context of this proceeding, the
aggregate equity of the charitable Foundation in AHS Liquidating is equal
to the fair market value of BCBSME plus any projected increases in net
assets minus any liabilities reasonably attributable to BCBSME as fair
market value deductions.
Decision p. 40. This court finds no principle of law or evidence to suggest that this is an
unreasonable or unlawful interpretation of the requirem ent provided the
Superintendent to comply with the conversion law and to determine the value of the
aggregate equity at the completion of the plan for purposes of disposition to the
foundation.
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The second major thrust of petitioner's request for relief is their argument that
there is insufficient evidence in the record for the Superintendent to determine the final
value of BCBSME or that his decision as to value is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record. The Attorney General argues that the petitioner wrongfully
rejected the forecast of increased enrollment in Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine based
upon an anticipated State contract and termination of the Tufts Plan. Petitioner further
argues the Superintendent was required to consider the five factors presented by the
applicant's expert and failed to do so and that the Superintendent did not consider
longer term forecast in consideration of value rather than the oncoming fiscal year.
Consumers for Affordable Health Care argues that the Superintendent did not consider
a number of factors based upon expert opinion as well as statutory requirements.
Changes in the marketplace, other stock transfers in the industry, and the like were
omitted from the reasoning by the Superintendent and therefore he limited himself to
the cash position of the applicant only.
The Superintendent responds that he was required only to find that the plan and
therefore the value was fair and equitable and that he concludes that only one expert
suggested an increase in valuation. The Superintendent did not find that expert's
testimony credible in that regard. It must be noted that credibility of the witnesses is in
the exclusive province of the factfinding agency.

Sprague Electric Co. v. Maine

Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 554 A.2d 728, 732 (Me. 1988).

The Superintendent

enumerates the factors that were considered and rejects the idea that his findings could
be based upon any precise information or mathematical formula. For example, he did
not consider evidence with respect to the value of stock in the marketplace because he
was aware that with regard to Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine there were only one
15

credible proposal put forward and that was the Anthem offer.

Further, the

Superintendent notes that there is no evidence anywhere on this record to suggest that
the final value of the aggregate equity should be higher than his conclusion.
A review of final agency action brought in the Superior Court is a process
pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 11001 et seq. known as the Maine Administrative Procedrire
Act. Title 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007 provides that this court may affirm the decision of the
Superintendent, remand the case for further proceedings as described by the court, and
reverse or modify the decision if the court finds one of six possible deficiencies. They
are that the decision is in violation of constitution or statute, in excess of the statutory
authority of the agency, made upon unlawful procedure, affected by bias or error of
law, unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record or arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion. The petitioner argues that the
Superintendent’s decision as to value is affected by error of law and unsupported by
substantial evidence. The statute provides a further requirement that the court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency on questions of fact.
This deference as to the facts has been extended by case law to affording proper
deference to the agency's interpretation of statutes which it administers. This court
must accord the agency substantial deference "unless the statute plainly compels a
contrary result." In re Wage Payment Litigation, 2000 ME 162, 759 A.2d 217, 221. See also
York Mutual bis. Co. v. Superintendent o f Ins., 485 A.2d 239, 241 (Me. 1984). In the final
analysis, the Superintendent has determined, in keeping with the legislative scheme,
section 2301(9-D) as requiring him to obtain an appraisal for determining the value of
the aggregate equity of the converted insurer.

Since the aggregate equity of the

converted insurer can be affected by other options within the statute such as the
16

interest of subscribers and the interest of directors and officers, he determines the
requirement of the date of the completed plan to affect the definition of aggregate
equity and not the appraisal. This is one reasonable interpretation based upon plain
language. There is nothing in this statute, plain language or otherwise, to compel a
contrary result.
Whether there is more evidence on the record to suggest a different final
valuation upon updated modification of the appraisal is not the question before the
court.

The question is whether there was substantial evidence to support the

Superintendent's findings. Notwithstanding some evidence to the contrary, the court is
satisfied that the Superintendent examined all of the evidence required by statute and
all the evidence that comported with his interpretation of the statute and that required
him to find in order to allow him to make a determination as to whether the conversion
plan was fair and equitable. Section 2301(9-D)(1).

His interpretation of the appraisal

allowed him to be enabled to make a determination of value for purposes of liquidation
to the Foundation. Section 2301(9-D)(I).
One final observation: 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(C) authorizes a nonprofit hospital
and medical service organization to convert to become a domestic stock insurer
pursuant to a conversion plan that is approved by the Superintendent. The appraisal to
be included within the conversion plan must enable the Superintendent to make a
determination of value for purposes of, among other things, determining the amount
that the charitable trust will be entitled to receive. Section 2301(9-D)(I)(l)(a). In spite of
the language of the Maine Administrative Procedures Act which allows this court to
modify a decision of an administrative agency, responsibilities of the Superintendent of
Insurance with respect to a conversion plan under Title 24 are not made up of severable
17

parts. It is one process of consideration of one conversion plan. The Superintendent
may accept or reject the plan just as he may accept or reject the appraisal. The
petitioner has provided no authority to suggest that the Superintendent may modify a
part of the conversion plan or to modify a purchase agreement which provides the
funding for the liquidation plan. While the petitioner suggests the court may require
the Superintendent to have an additional appraisal performed in order to place a new
value on the amount available to the Foundation/ this would require a finding by this
court that the approval of the conversion plan was in error as not founded upon a
proper utilization of the statute. While this matter is moot given the conclusions by this
court as to the application of the law and the evidence supporting the decision/ it must
be observed that it would be a rather extraordinary precedent for this court to impose
upon the Superintendent an ability to modify a conversion plan which does not exist in
Title 24.
For all the reasons cited herein/ the entry will be:
The decision and order of the Superintendent of Insurance in the
matter of the application of Associated Hospital Service of Maine d/b/a
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine to convert to a stock insurer and
voluntarily liquidate and dissolve and in the matter of application of
Anthem Health Plan of Maine, Inc. to acquire the assets of Associated
Hospital Service of Maine d/b/a Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine and
related transactions is AFFIRMED.

Dated:

/"2~
Donald H. Marden
Justice, Superior Court
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CONSUMERS FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE, INC.
v.
SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE et aim
ALEXANDER, J.
[fl] Consumers for Affordable Health Care, Inc. (CAHC), appeals from a
judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Marden, J.) affirming the
Superintendent of Insurance's determination of the value of Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Maine related to its conversion from a nonprofit medical and hospital service
organization to a domestic stock insurance company controlled by Anthem Insurance
Companies (Anthem). CAHC contends that the Superintendent (1) erred in setting the
time at which valuation is determined, and (2) found a fair market value of the aggregate
equity of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maine that is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Anthem challenges CAHC's standing to bring this appeal and
argues that the appeal is moot. We reach the merits of the appeal and affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
I. CASE HISTORY
[f2] Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maine (BCBSME) was originally
incorporated as a charitable institution to provide nonprofit hospital and medical service
plans.m See P. & S.L. 1939, ch. 24; P. & S.L. 1943, ch. 21; P.L. 1993, ch. 702, § A-19;
P.L. 1997, ch. 344, § 9. Such nonprofit hospital and medical service organizations may
convert to a domestic stockholder owned insurance company with the approval of the
Superintendent of Insurance. 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D) (2000). The approval is
conditioned on several factors, including valuation of the corporation and payment of the
value of the charitable interest in the converted corporation into a charitable trust. 24
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M.R.S.A. § 2301 (9-D), (E)(3), (I).
[Tf3] In the late 1990s, BCBSME's Board of Directors decided that BCBSME
should convert to a domestic stock corporation and be sold. After soliciting statements of
interest from several potential buyers, the Board determined that Anthem offered what
the Board viewed as the strongest proposal.
[Tf4] Anthem agreed to acquire substantially all of the assets and assume
substantially all of the liabilities of BCBSME in a negotiated Asset Purchase Agreement.
This agreement contemplated payment of $120 million, with net proceeds of $81.69
million after adjusting for certain of BCBSME's liabilities and the estimated transaction
costs. The Asset Purchase Agreement was approved by the Board on July 13, 1999.
BCBSME then retained Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Financial Advisors, Inc.
(HLHZ), to perform an appraisal of the company for consideration by the Superintendent
of Insurance. HLHZ appraised BCBSME's fair market value at $102.5 million as of July
13, 1999, the date of the Asset Purchase Agreement.
[f5] On September 15, 1999, the Board approved a plan, pursuant to 24 M.R.S.A.
§ 2301(9-D), to convert BCBSME from a nonprofit hospital and medical service
organization to a domestic stock insurance company named AHS Liquidating
Corporation (AHS Liquidating). The conversion plan and the HLHZ appraisal was then
filed with the Maine Bureau of Insurance for approval of the conversion and acquisition.
The plan indicated that upon the sale of its assets to Anthem, AHS Liquidating would
liquidate and dissolve, with its assets placed into a charitable trust for the benefit of the
Maine Health Access Foundation, Inc. (Foundation).m The conversion plan anticipated
that the role of the trust would be "to fund health care programs that will meet the unmet
health care needs of the citizens of Maine."
[^[6] Approval and valuation proceedings were initiated in November 1999. The
Superintendent of Insurance granted CAHC and others intervenor status in the
proceedings.
[^[7] During the hearings, the Superintendent heard testimony from over twenty
witnesses, including several experts on the issue of valuation. Two finance experts from
HLHZ explained their valuation process and how they arrived at the $102.5 million
appraisal. The Superintendent also heard and received testimony from two other
valuation experts for BCBSME and one valuation expert for CAHC. An expert for the
Attorney General also filed an opinion reviewing the HLHZ appraisal and a fairness
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opinion filed by a BCBSME expert.
m
Several experts concluded that the HLHZ appraisal applied appropriate
methodologies and arrived at a reasonable valuation. Those experts indicated that the
value of BCBSME had declined subsequent to the July 13, 1999, appraisal. Two experts
stated that the adjusted fair market value of BCBSME was less than the $81,69 million
Anthem had agreed to pay to initiate the Foundation.
[1f9] CAHC's expert stated an opinion contrary to the other expert opinions. He
testified that while the methodologies utilized by HLHZ were reasonable, he believed
that a revaluation of BCBSME would yield a higher valuation because, in part: (1) HLHZ
applied too high a discount rate in its discounted cash flow analysis; (2) BCBSME had
less business risk than implied in the HLHZ analysis; and (3) BCBSME likely had a
higher market share subsequent to the appraisal. The CAHC expert also testified that (1)
he had never done a fair market value appraisal of an insurance company or a managed
care company; (2) he had been involved only once in the preparation of a written fairness
opinion; and (3) he did not do an independent valuation analysis of BCBSME.
[flO] The Superintendent issued an eighty-five page opinion on May 25, 2000,
approving the conversion. The Superintendent relied upon HLHZ's $102.5 million
appraisal, adjusted by $18.1 million for the actual losses suffered by BCBSME through
the end of 1999, as well as the $3.9 million transaction expenses incurred by BCBSME
during the conversion process. With these adjustments, the Superintendent found the fair
market value of the Foundation's aggregate equity interest in AHS Liquidating to be
$80.5 million. Because the determined fair market value was less than the $81.69 million
that Anthem had agreed to provide to the Foundation in the amended Asset Purchase
Agreement, the Superintendent approved the transaction as fair and ordered the payment
of not less than $81.69 million to the Foundation.
[Tfl 1] Following the issuance of the Superintendent's decision, Anthem and
BCBSME waited 10 days, as required by 24-A M.R.S.A. § 222(4-A)(C) (2000),m then
closed their transaction on June 5, 2000. Upon closing, and after the dissolution of AHS
Liquidating, Anthem made the required distribution of $81.69 million to the Foundation
and assumed the liabilities of AHS Liquidating.
[^f12] The day after the closing, June 6, 2000, CAHC filed its petition for review
of final agency action, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, seeking reversal of the portion of
the Superintendent's decision that established the value of the outstanding stock of AHS
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Liquidating Corporation.^ After hearing, the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the
Superintendent.
[Tf13] The Superior Court found reasonable the Superintendent's interpretation
that 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(I) requires utilization of the appraisal submitted with the
conversion plan as a . "starting point" to determine the "fair market [value] of the
aggregate equity held by the Foundation in the converted insurer [AHS Liquidating],"
with the aggregate equity to be an amount "equal to the fair market value of BCBSME
plus any projected increases in net assets minus any liabilities reasonably attributable to
BCBSME as fair market value deductions." The court also found sufficient evidence in
the record to support the Superintendent’s determination of value for distribution to the
Foundation, This appeal followed.
II. CAHC STANDING
[114] Anthem contends that CAHC lacks standing because, as found by the
Superintendent, "CAHC failed to establish that it would be substantially and directly
affected by the [Superintendent's] decision on the proposed acquisition,"
[fl5] The right to appeal from an administrative decision is statutory, with the
necessary "standing" of a party dependent upon the wording of the specific statute
involved. New England Herald Dev. Group v. Town o f Falmouth, 521 A.2d 693, 695
(Me. 1987); Singal v. City o f Bangor, 440 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me. 1982). The appeal
statute at issue, 24-A M.R.S.A. § 236 (2000), provides, in pertinent part:
1.
In general, judicial review of actions taken by the superintendent
or his representatives shall occur [in conformity] with the provisions set
forth in the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, Title 5, chapter 375,
subchapter VII.

3. Any person who was a party to the hearing may appeal from an
order o f the superintendent within 30 days after receipt o f notice. Any
person not a party to the hearing whose interests are substantially and
directly affected and who is aggrieved by an order of the superintendent may
appeal within 40 days from the date the decision was rendered. If the appeal
is taken from the superintendent's failure or refusal to act, the petition for
review shall be filed within 6 months of the expiration of the time within
which the action should reasonably have occurred.
(Emphasis added.)
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[11 6] In Superintendent o f Insurance v. Attorney General, 558 A.2d 1197, 1200™
01 (Me. 1989), we interpreted section 236(3) to confer a "more expansive grant of
standing" than that conferred by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 M.R.S.A. §
11001(1) (2002),£6] and we held that the Attorney General, "as a party" to the
proceedings before the Bureau of Insurance, had standing to pursue an appeal.
Superintendent o f Ins., 558 A.2d at 1201.
[HI 7] CAHC was a "party" to the conversion proceedings. According to the
APA, a personm who "participates] in the adjudicatory proceeding pursuant to section
9054, subsection 1 or 2" is a party to that administrative proceeding. 5 M.R.S.A. § 8002
(7) (2002). Without opposition by Anthem or BCBSME, the Superintendent granted
CAHC permissive intervenor status pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 9054(2) (2002),m
permitting CAHC to "engage in discovery, present evidence and conduct crossexamination." As a permissive intervenor, and therefore a party to the conversion
proceedings, CAHC has standing to pursue this appeal because "[a]ny person who was a
party to the hearing may appeal from an order of the superintendent." 24-A M.R.S.A. §
236(3).
III. MOOTNESS
[118] Anthem contends that this appeal is moot, because the "multiple, complex
transactions flowing from the acquisition and unfolding since that date [June 5, 2000]
cannot now be undone" and, therefore, we cannot order any practical relief. The nature
of any relief that may be accorded to CAHC if it is successful is not entirely clear,
particularly in light of changes in the economy since the spring of 2000, which could
adversely affect any reexamination of valuation. However, we need not determine what
future relief might be possible in the circumstances of this case. Even if an action could
be moot, we will address the merits of a case in circumstances where: (1) sufficient
collateral consequences will result from the determination of the questions presented so
as to justify relief;^ (2) the appeal contains questions of great public concern that, in the
interest of providing future guidance to the bar and public, we should address; or (3) the
issues are capable of repetition but evade review because of their fleeting or determinate
nature.rioi See Monroe v. Town o f Gray, 1999 ME 190, ^ 5, 743 A.2d 1257, 1258-59;
Halfway House, Inc. v. City of Portland, 670 A.2d 1377, 1380 (Me. 1996).
[f 19] The exception for "questions of great public concern" applies here. In King
Resources Co. v. Environmental Improvement Commission, 270 A.2d 863, 870 (Me. 1970),
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we identified several considerations in addressing the great public concern exception,
including "the public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an
authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, and the likelihood
of future recurrence of the question."
[1f20] The conversion of BCBSME to a domestic stock insurer is a question of
great importance to the public because the organization, prior to conversion, was both a
major health insurer and a public charity with its assets held for the purpose of fulfilling
its charitable purposes. See 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(3-C) (2000). Those purposes included:
[Providing access to medical care through affordable health insurance and
affordable managed care products for persons of all incomes; identifying and
addressing the State's unmet health care needs, particularly with respect to
medically uninsured and underserved populations; making services and care
available through participating providers; and improving the quality of care
for medically uninsured and underserved populations.
Id
[Tf21] An improper interpretation of the conversion statute, potentially resulting
in a lower appraisal value, would affect both the insureds' and the uninsureds' access to
health care. Because of the potentially large detrimental results to the public, the
organizations, and the administrative agency, an authoritative resolution of the issues is
appropriate.
IV. VALUATION
H[22] When the Superior Court acts in its appellate capacity, we review the
administrative record directly to determine whether the agency abused its discretion,
committed an error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Green v. Coming o f Dep't o f Mental Health, Mental Retardation & Substance
Abuse Servs,, 2001 ME 86, %9, 776 A.2d 612, 615.
[1(23] A nonprofit hospital and medical service organization'siiu conversions to a
domestic stock insurer is governed by 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D) (2000) (conversion
statute). The process of conversion is initiated by filing a "conversion plan," a detailed
description of the proposed transaction, with the Superintendent of Insurance. See id. §
2301(9-D)(B)(4).£i3i Concurrent with the filing of the conversion plan, the organization
must file a charitable trust plan with the Superintendent and the Attorney General
describing the charitable trust or trusts that will receive the ownership interest of the
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organization following its conversion to a domestic stock insurer.nn 5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A
(5)(B)(1) (2002); see also 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(D); 5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A(2).
[1f24] The Attorney General is then required to file an action in Superior Court
seeking approval of the charitable trust plan, which triggers the Superintendent's
obligation to conduct a review of the conversion plan. 5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A(5)(A)-(B); 24
M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(D). A nonprofit hospital and medical service organization may
not amend its charter to become a domestic stock insurer, until the Superintendent
conducts an adjudicatoiy hearing and issues final approval of the conversion plan. 24
M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(C), (E).
[125] The Superintendent may not finally approve the conversion plan unless,
among other requirements, the Superintendent finds that the terms and conditions of the
plan are fair and equitable. Id. § 2301(9-D)(E)(1). In making this determination, the
Superintendent must consider: "(1) Whether the conversion plan complies with the
provisions of and purposes of this subsection and any rules of the superintendent that may
be adopted under this subsection[, and] (2) Whether the conversion plan would adversely
affect, in any manner, the services to be rendered to subscribers." Id. § 2301(9-D)(L).
[126] The conversion statute contains numerous provisions affecting the contents
of the conversion plan. See id. § 2301(9-D)(E)~(I). Among those requirements is the
appraisal provision at issue:
The conversion plan must include an appraisal of the fair market value, or
range of values, of the aggregate equity of the converted stock insurer to be
outstanding upon completion of the conversion plan and, if a range of
values, the methodology for fixing a final value coincident with the
completion of the transactions provided for in the conversion plan.
(1) The appraisal must enable determinations of value for purposes
of:
(a) The amount of cash or other assets that subscribers or the
charitable trust will be entitled to receive, without
consideration, under the provisions of the conversion plan
required by [section 2301(9-D)(E)(3) and (4)]; and
(b)
The price of any shares to be issued pursuant to the
optional provisions of a conversion plan permitted by [section
2301(9-D)(G)].
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Id. § 2301(9-D)(I), As used in the statute, m[f]air market value' means the value of an
organization or an affiliate or the value of the assets of such an entity determined as if the
entity had voting stock outstanding and 100% of its stock were freely transferrable and
available for purchase without restrictions." Id. § 2301(9-D)(B)(6).
[^[27] The Superintendent interpreted this provision to require the appraisal to
state the fair market value of the converted stock insurer, AHS Liquidating, after
adjusting for BCBSME's liabilities. Specifically, the Superintendent interpreted the
phrase "fair market value . . . of the converted stock insurer to be outstanding upon
completion of the conversion plan" to mean "the fair market value of the Foundation's
100% ownership interest in BCBSME following the conversion with the conversion
being the mechanism to account for Blue Cross' liabilities."
[^28] The Superintendent explained:
It is the judgment of the Superintendent that the Legislature, in
requiring the filing of an appraisal with the conversion plan, intended to
have a baseline fair market value of the aggregate equity of the converted
insurer established which baseline could be reviewed, questioned, and tested
throughout the hearing process. The appraisal becomes the basis for
determining the Foundation's aggregate equity in AHS Liquidating (the
converted insurer). From that, the Superintendent must determine the
amount of any assets to be tendered to the Foundation in recognition of the
charitable status of BCBSME.
[^[29] CAHC asserts that (1) the statute requires the applicant for conversion to
provide the Superintendent with an appraisal that values the company as of completion of
the conversion plan, and (2) the Superintendent erred in substituting the adjusted
valuation based on the appraisal dated nearly one year prior to the completion of the
conversion plan.
fl[30] The Legislature has charged the Superintendent with administration of the
conversion statute, relying on the Superintendent's expertise in insurance and insurance
related valuation matters. Our review of agency ratemaking or valuation decisions is
particularly deferential because ratemaking or valuation relies heavily on agency
expertise in its assigned area. See Indus. Energy Consumer Group v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
2001 ME 94, % 11, 773 A.2d 1038, 1041; New England Tel & Tel Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 448 A.2d 272, 279 (Me. 1982). Thus, in Maine AFL-CIO v. Superintendent o f
Insurance, 595 A.2d 424, 429 (Me. 1991), we stated:
We do not, nor should we attempt to second-guess the Superintendent on
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matters falling within the realm of his expertise . . . . We will interfere only
when the Superintendent abuses the discretion entrusted to him, fails to
follow a legislative mandate or violates the federal or states constitutions . . .
. We also accord due consideration to the Superintendent's interpretation
and application of technical statutes and regulations and will overturn the
Superintendent’s action only if the statute or regulation plainly compels a
contrary result.
(Citations omitted.)
[f31] The language of 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(I) supports the Superintendent's
interpretation. The statute provides that the "conversion plan must include an appraisal,"
id., indicating that only one appraisal of the fair market value of the converted stock
insurer is necessary. Because the applicant files the conversion plan, 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301
(9-D)(B)(4), and the conversion plan must include an appraisal, id., § 2301(9-D)(I), it is
logical that the applicant bears the burden of supplying the Superintendent a valuation of
the company. The statute does not require the submission of additional comprehensive
appraisals after the conversion plan is filed.
[p2] The Superintendent is also correct that the statutory phrase "upon
completion of the conversion plan" refers to the valuation of the "aggregate equity of the
converted stock insurer." Id. The phrase does not refer to the appraisal, as argued by
CAHC.
fl[33] Reading the appraisal provision as a whole indicates that the appraisal must
be of the fair market value of the aggregate equity of the converted stock insurer, AHS
Liquidating, that will be outstanding at the completion of the conversion plan. Because
"[t]he appraisal must enable determinations of value for purposes o f . . . [t]he amount of
cash or other assets th a t. . . the charitable trust will be entitled to receive," id. § 2301(9D)(I)(1), the appraisal itself cannot provide the final valuation of the company. The
Superintendent, therefore, was acting within the range of his authority and expertise in
interpreting the statute to require that applicants submit an appraisal with the conversion
plan that provides a "baseline fair market value of the aggregate equity of the converted
insurer" from which the Superintendent could later determine AHS Liquidating^ fair
market value at the time of completion of the conversion plan. See id.
[T[34] Because the statute prohibits the organization's amendment of its charter
unless the Superintendent conducts an adjudicatory hearing and approves the plan, id. §
2301(9-D)(C), an applicant for conversion cannot know the exact date of conversion, or

http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions/documents/02mel58co.htm

10/17/2002

M AINE SU PREM E JU D IC IA L COURT

Page 10 o f 14

even whether the conversion will be approved. It would be impossible for an applicant to
submit an appraisal at the time the conversion plan is filed that values the company upon
an unknown conversion date. CAHC contends that an applicant may set a conversion
date far in the future and then must base the appraisal upon that date. However, this
approach would result in an overly speculative fair market value determination. In this
case, that might have resulted in less funds being allocated to the charitable trust.
[1(35] The appraisal submitted by BCBSME complied with the Superintendent's
interpretation of the appraisal provision. That appraisal expressed an opinion on the fair
market value of the company by assuming that completion of the conversion plan was
July 13, 1999, the date of the Asset Purchase Agreement. The Superintendent, therefore,
properly relied upon HLHZ's appraisal as a starting point to determine the fair market
value of the converted insurer.
V. THE $18.1 MILLION LOSS ADJUSTMENT
[TJ36] In determining the fair market value of the aggregate equity of the
converted insurer to be $80.5 million, see 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)(I), the
Superintendent utilized the following formula: "the aggregate equity of the charitable
Foundation in AHS Liquidating is equal to the fair market value of BCBSME plus any
projected increases in net assets minus any liabilities reasonably attributable to BCBSME
as fair market value deductions." The Superintendent defined "fair market value
adjustments as those which were not included in the HLHZ appraisal, that represent
actual, not projected, numbers, and are attributable to Blue Cross and not some other
entity."
[TJ37] In applying the formula, the Superintendent found reasonable the HLHZ
appraisal, which established the fair market value of the aggregate equity for the
converted insurer to be $102.5 million as of July 13, 1999. The Superintendent next
concluded that the record did not support any net increases in profitability. Although
CAHC's expert testified that BCBSME's profitability had increased from the time that
HLHZ conducted its appraisal, the Superintendent found this testimony incredible
because, "aside from these bare assertions, there is nothing in the record to support [the
expert's] theory."
[^[38] The Superintendent then subtracted two adjustments from the $102.5
million appraisal value to arrive at the fair market value of BCBSME: (1) $18.1 million
in actual losses sustained by BCBSME as of year end 1999, $10 million of which
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represented Y2K compliance expenses, and (2) $3.9 million for BCBSME's share of the
conversion transaction expenses. Focusing on the adjustment for actual losses, CAHC
contends that the Superintendent improperly deducted the $18.1 million because (1) the
portion of those expenses representing Y2K expenses were already taken into account by
HLHZ, and (2) HLHZ already "substantially reduced its valuation of BCBSME on the
assumption that BCBSME would not meet its financial projections" by applying a high
discount rate in its discounted cash flow analysis,
[1f39] In arriving at the fair market value determination of $102.5 million, the
HLHZ appraisal utilized both the market capitalization^] and discounted cash flownei
approaches, the basis for both being management-provided projections, or forecasted
operating results, for the years 1999 to 2001, The management-provided projections
estimated that BCBSME would expend an additional $6.1 million above and beyond the
amount budgeted to make its computers Y2K compliantim Because those expenses were
nonrecurring, HLHZ adjusted the projections by adding the Y2K expenses back into the
earnings stream. The $102.5 million appraisal, therefore, reflected the assumption that
the Y2K expenses had no impact upon the value of BCBSME.
[*¡40] Because BCBSME's conversion to a domestic stock insurer was complete
prior to December 31, 2000, the Foundation was entitled to "100% of the fair market
value of the organization" as of the date of the conversion. 5 M.R.S.A. § 194-A(2)(A).
"In determining fair market value, consideration must be given to value as a going
concern, market value, investment or earnings value, net asset value and a control
premium, if any." Id, § 194-A(1)(G). A conclusion regarding the net asset value \m
necessarily requires an adjustment for losses actually sustained after the completion of
the appraisal. The Superintendent, therefore, reduced the fair market value by those Y2K
compliance expenses actually incurred, because HLHZ did not adjust its valuation to
reflect those losses.
fl[41] The Superintendent did not err in adjusting the fair market value by
BCBSME's actual losses sustained in 1999. The discount rate selected by HLHZ was
based upon a projection that BCBSME would earn approximately $4.6 million in 1999.
BCBSME not only failed to fulfill that projection, but it also sustained losses in the
amount of $18,1 million. Because there is no evidence in the record that HLHZ assumed
an $18.1 million loss in arriving at the discount rate, the Superintendent properly reduced
the fair market value by that amount and did not double count Y2K expenses in doing so.
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The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
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Under nonprofit hospital and medical service plans, contracting hospitals and physicians provide

plan subscribers with medical, surgical, and hospital care. 24 M .R.S.A. § 2 3 0 1 (l)-(2 ) (2000).
131 Concurrent with the filing o f the conversion plan, BC BSM E and Anthem filed a proposed charitable
trust plan with the Attorney General, as required by 24 M .R.S.A. § 2301(9-D )(D ) (2000). A modified charitable
trust plan was filed in the Superior Court on November 15, 1999. The court first approved the charitable trust
plan on December 27, 1999, with a modification and amendments approved on May 26, 2000.
141 24-A M.R.S.A. § 222(4-A)(C) provides;
4-A. Tender offers. No person may make a tender offer for, or a request or invitation for
tenders of, or an agreement to exchange securities for, or otherwise acquire any voting security,
or any security convertible into a voting security, o f a domestic insurer or o f any person
controlling a domestic insurer if, as a result o f the consummation thereof, the person making the
tender offer, request or agreement, would, directly or indirectly, acquire actual control o f the
insurer or controlling person, and no person may enter into an agreement to merge with or may
otherwise acquire control o f a domestic insurer or its controlling person, unless:
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C, Ten days have elapsed from the date o f approval by the superintendent and no
injunction or other court order precludes consummation o f the offer, request, invitation,
agreement or acquisition.
[5] The Attorney General also filed a petition for review, alleging that "the Superintendent's decision is
in violation o f statutory provisions, affected by an error o f law, and unsupported by substantial evidence on the
record insofar as it determined the fair market o f the aggregate equity o f Blue Cross upon conversion." The
Attorney General sought only to reverse the Superintendent's decision and require BC BSM E to update the
appraisal o f the fair market value o f the aggregate equity o f AHS Liquidating. That action was consolidated with
the CAHC action on July 10, 2000. The Attorney General has not appealed from the Superior Court's judgment.
[6] 5 M.R.S.A. § 11001(1) provides:
1.
Agency Action. Except where a statute provides for direct review or review o f a pro
forma judicial decree by the Supreme Judicial Court or where judicial review is specifically
precluded or the issues therein limited by statute, any person who is aggrieved by final agency
action shall be entitled to judicial review thereof in the Superior Court in the manner provided by
this subchapter. Preliminary, procedural, intermediate or other nonfinal agency action shall be
independently reviewable only if review o f the final agency action would not provide an adequate
remedy.
171 "Person" is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, governmental entity, association or
public or private organization o f any character, other than the agency conducting the proceeding." 5 M .R.S.A. §
8002(8) (2002).
[8] Section 9054(2) provides: "The agency may, by order, allow any other interested person to intervene
and participate as a full or limited party to the proceeding. This subsection shall not be construed to limit public
participation in the proceeding in any other capacity." 5 M .R.S.A. § 9054(2) (2002).
[9] S e e S o r d y l v. S o r d y l, 1997 M E 87, % 6, 692 A.2d 1386, 1387 (noting that the collateral consequences
doctrine requires an appellant to "demonstrate that a decision on the merits o f the appeal will have more than
conjectural and insubstantial consequences in the future" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[10] S e e M e. C iv il L ib e r tie s U n io n v. C ity o f S. P o r tla n d , 1999 M E 121, f 10, 734 A.2d 191, 195 (stating
that issues capable o f repetition but evading review exist when there is a "reasonable likelihood that the same
issues will imminently and repeatedly recur in future similar contexts with serious impact upon important
generalized public interests").
[11] Nonprofit hospital and medical service organization is defined as:
[A] corporation or other entity authorized by the superintendent or organized pursuant to Title 24
for the purpose o f providing nonprofit hospital service plans within the meaning o f Title 24,
section 2301, subsection 1 and nonprofit medical service plans within the meaning o f Title 24,
section 2301, subsection 2. It does not include any organization that provides only nonprofit
health care plans within the meaning o f Title 24, section 2301, subsection 3 or a health insurance
affiliate as defined in Title 24, section 2308-A .
5 M .R.S.A, § 194-A(1)(K) (2002); a c c o r d 2 4 M .R.S.A. § 2301(9-D )(B)(8). The legislature has specifically
designated such an organization "a charitable and benevolent institution and a public charity," requiring its assets
to be held for the organization's charitable purposes. 5 M .R.S.A. § 194-A(2) (2002).
[12] "'Conversion' means the process by which an organization, with the approval o f the superintendent,
converts to a domestic stock insurer . . .
24 M .R.S.A. § 2301(9-D )(B)(3); s e e a ls o 5 M .R.S.A. § 194-A(1)(F)
( 2002 ).

[13]
The conversion plan is the "written plan that sets forth the provisions required by the superintendent,
that is filed with the superintendent pursuant to [24 M .R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)], that sets forth a complete description
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o f the proposed conversion and that contains sufficient detail to permit the superintendent to make the
findings required under [24 M .R.S.A. § 2301(9-D)]." 24 M.R.S.A. § 2301(9-D )(B)(4) (2000).
[14] Provided the organization has materially changed form, s e e 5 M .R.S.A. § 194-A(1)(I), on or before
December 31, 2000, the charitable trust will own 100% o f the fair market value o f the organization as o f the date
o f the conversion. 5 M .R.S.A. § 194-A(2)(A). If the material change in form occurs after December 31, 2000,
however, the charitable trust owns 95% o f the fair market value o f the organization as o f the date o f the material
change, with the remaining 5% being owned by the subscribers. 5 M .R.S.A. § 194-A (2)(B) (2002). The statute
identifies "subscribers," for purposes o f defining ownership interest in the charitable trust, as "only those persons
who were subscribers on any date in the 3-year period immediately prior to the material change in form, if in each
case the person was a subscriber for a period o f no less than 3 consecutive months." 5 M .R.S.A. § 194-A(2)(B).
[15] The market capitalization approach examines evidence from comparable publicly-traded companies
as well as recently acquired companies to estimate the value o f a company.
[16] The discounted cash flow approach "is based on the premise that the value o f an investment is equal
to the present value o f the future cash flows,"
[17] In actuality, B C BSM E incurred approximately $10 million in Y 2K expenses.
[18] A company's net asset value, or book value, is calculated by subtracting intangible assets such as goodwill
and patents, current liabilities, and long-term liabilities from a company's total assets. B a lla y v. L e g g M a s o n
W o o d W a lker, In c ., 925 F.2d 682, 685 n.4 (3d Cir. 1991) (defining book value from an excerpt from Barron's
Dictionary o f Finance and Investment Terms).
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